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Faculty and Deans

THE CONSTITUTION OUTSIDE THE COURTS*
Michael J. Gerhardt**
Fifteen years ago, Attorney General Edwin Meese gave a speech that sent
shockwaves through the legal community. In the speech, Meese boldly claimed that
the Supreme Court was not the final arbiter of constitutional meaning. He suggested
there was a distinction between the Constitution, which was the supreme law of the
land, and the Supreme Court's pronouncements on it, which were not. He
explained, "If the Court's decisions really were the supreme law of the land, binding
on all persons and governmental entities, including the Court itself, the Court would
not be able to change its mind," and we would all be forced permanently to abide by
the Court's "derelicts," such as Dred Scott v. Sanford, until or unless they were
overturned by a constitutional amendment. Meese also acknowledged that the Court
was not the only institution responsible for interpreting the Constitution: "[E]very
official takes an oath precisely to" the same "effect." Meese's speech was widely
viewed as a surprising assault on judicial supremacy-the Court's authority as the
final arbiter of constitutional meaning-and consequently drew heated protests,
including a rejoinder from Associate Justice William Brennan.
Fifteen years later, Meese's attack on judicial supremacy might seem to some
as antiquated, quaint, perhaps irrelevant, and maybe even obvious. To others, it
might be sacreligious. Fifteen years later, it might also seem ironic. For the debate
over judicial supremacy persists with one major difference being that the parties
have switched sides. Many scholars who defended judicial supremacy fifteen years
ago now decry it, while many people who had defended Meese have stood silently
by in a period in which the Court has tempted its critics by striking down nearly
thirty federal laws in six years. The fact is that judicial supremacy is not a view
unique to either liberals or conservatives. Our views on judicial supremacy seem to
be inextricably linked to the extent of our agreement with the Court's reasoning,
rulings, and direction.

•
Professor Michael J. Gerhardt delivered this speech at Drake Law School on September
26, 2002, as part of the Drake Constitutional Law Center Distinguished Speaker Series. Portions of the
speech were previously published in the Montana Law Review, and are reprinted here with the express
permission of the Montana Law Review. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Crisis and Constitutionalism, 63
MONT. L. REv. 277 (2002).
••
Arthur B. Hanson Chair in Constitutional Law, College of William & Mary, MarshallWythe School of Law.
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My purpose today is to consider what, if anything, has changed since Meese's
speech, particularly with respect to our views on judicial supremacy and the
Constitution outside the Court? Some things are clear. It is certainly true that in the
fifteen years after Attorney Gerieral Meese's speech, we have had a considerable
number of political developments and controversies: We have had four Presidents,
replaced six justices on the Supreme Court, impeached and acquitted for only the
second time in our history a President of the United States, watched the Supreme
Court for the first time help to resolve a contested presidential election, had four
very contentious confirmation proceedings on four nominees to the Supreme Court
(including one rejected by the Senate, another forced to withdraw his nomination,
yet another confirmed by the closest vote in the history of Supreme Court
confirmations, and one other confirmed as Chief Justice by the closest vote ever for
a successful nominee to the chiefjusticeship), had dozens ofjudicial nominees who
had their appointments frustrated or impeded by a variety of actions in the United
States Senate, added a new amendment to the United States Constitution, endured
the most devastating domestic terrorist attack in our history, and have been engaged
in two wars in the Middle East, with one more on the horizon. While these
developments clearly support Meese's point-twenty of the twenty-one events to
which I have referred involved critical constitutional decision making outside the
Supreme Court-we have yet to assess just how either the notion of the Constitution
outside the Court or Meese's target-judicial supremacy-has fared in the
intervening period. The time is overdue to consider how the debate over judicial
supremacy has evolved over the past fifteen years. How have our attitudes about
either the Court or about the Constitution outside the Court changed? What have we
learned about the great questions Meese dramatically discussed fifteen years ago?
These questions lead me tonight to consider several themes that have
developed over the years relating to the evolution of our understanding of the
Constitution outside the Courts. Each sheds important light on both the significance
of constitutional interpretation by actors other than the Court and the state of
contemporary constitutional theory.
First, we persist, for good reason, in having the United States Supreme Court
as the institution we most closely associate with the Constitution. One reason is that
no other institution seems to speak so regularly about constitutional matters as does
the Court. It is not just that we have several hundred volumes of Supreme Court
commentary on the Constitution. It is also that, as Attorney General Meese
recognized, "the Court is the only branch that routinely, day in and day out, is
charged with the awesome task of addressing the most basic and enduring political
questions: What is due process of law? How does the idea of separation of powers
affect the Congress in certain circumstances? And so forth." Others might go
further to suggest that the Court as an institution is better able to make principled
judgments about the Constitution than any of the other branches. Its members
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reputedly have more time and expertise and more incentive to be impartial in
addressing the great questions of constitutional law. They are insulated from direct
political pressures because they have life tenure and are guaranteed undiminished
compensation, and their duty is, in John Marshall's famous words, "to say what the
law is." And if the law in question happens to be the Constitution, then it of course
follows the Court has the duty to say what it means in any cases that fall properly
within its jurisdiction.
Second, the fixation of our legal culture on the Supreme Court comes at a
price, particularly the failure of legal scholars and perhaps the general public to still
not consider very seriously how much and how well the other branches (and even
state governments) deal with the Constitution. It is hard to overstate the range or
significance of constitutional decision making that occurs outside the Court. To be
sure, Attorney General Meese mentioned a couple of the more dramatic moments in
our history in which presidents made critical constitutional pronouncements. In
particular, he mentioned one ofthe most famous of these instances from our early
history when President Andrew Jackson vetoed the Second National Bank. Even
though the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the National Bank,
President Jackson maintained both that Supreme Court precedent should not be
confused with the Constitution and that as President he too had a responsibility to
assert his constitutional views. President Jackson proclaimed:
Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded
as deciding questions of constitutional power except where the acquiescence of
the people and the States can be considered as well settled. [Moreover,] the
opinion of the Supreme Court . . . ought not to control the coordinate
authorities of this Government. The Congress, the Executive, and the Court
must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each
public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will
support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others ... The
opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of
Congress has over the judges, and on that the President is independent ofboth.
The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control
the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to
have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.

It is not an exaggeration, I think, to say that every subsequent president has agreed
with Jackson on the independent authority and responsibility of the President to
interpret the Constitution.
Attorney General Meese did not mention the after effects of President
Jackson's famous veto. It sent shockwaves through the political system, and
triggered a series of other constitutional judgments outside the Court. To begin
with, Jackson's veto succeeded in killing off the rechartering ofthe National Bank;
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however, he still had to deal with the fact that the National Bank had a couple more
years to operate under its initial charter. Consequently, Jackson undertook unilateral
action to kill the Bank. He instructed his Secretary of the Treasury, William Duane,
to remove all of the deposits from the National Bank and deposit them in state
banks. Duane refused. He had concerns about the legality of the President's order.
So, Jackson fired Duane, taking a finn stand on an unresolved constitutional issue
about the President's authority to remove unilaterally an official confinned by the
Senate. Jackson, never one to back down, did not stop there. He asked his thenAttorney General, Roger Taney, to take over Duane's responsibilities as Treasury
Secretary. Taney agreed, and wasted no time in implementing Jackson's plan to
transfer National Bank deposits to state banks. Many senators were outraged. They
retaliated against Jackson and Taney in several ways. They passed the first and only
censure resolution ever against a president to denounce Jackson for trying to destroy
the National Bank, which of course owed its existence to previously passed
legislation and the Court's imprimatur. Jackson scoffed at the censure resolution,
maintaining that if he had truly done something illegal, the proper remedy was to
impeach and remove him from office, something he knew that the Congress lacked
the fortitude and votes to accomplish. Meanwhile, the Senate rejected Taney's
nomination as Treasury Secretary based in part on disagreements with the
legitimacy ofhis implementation ofJackson's order. For good measure, the Senate
rejected Taney's subsequent nomination to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court. When the dust finally began to settle, the Senate, under new leadership,
expunged the censure resolution and affirmed Taney's nomination as Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court.
The extraordinary battle over the National Bank was only one of many
significant constitutional debates outside the Court that occurred in the nineteenth
century. At the risk of trying your patience, I note only a few of the more heated
disputes. For instance, during the presidency of Thomas Jefferson there were
constitutional challenges over the continued legitimacy of the Alien and Sedition
Act, the impeachment of Federalist judges, including Associate Justice Samuel
Chase, efforts to abolish recently created circuit courts, Aaron Burr's treason trial,
battles with the Tripoli pirates, the Louisiana Purchase, and the legitimacy of a
presidential trade embargo authorized by statute. In addition, the Constitution was
amended to include the only constitutional amendment passed between Jefferson's
presidency and the end of the Civil War, namely, the Twelfth Amendment, which
had been ratified to fix a defect in the presidential electoral process that had forced
the House of Representatives to confinn Jefferson's election as President. Other
constitutional controversies continued apace under Jefferson's successors through
the first half of the century, as the nation faced the War of 1812; the Missouri
Compromise and the Kansas-Nebraska Act (both raising serious questions about
Congress's authority to condition admission of states on measures that it could not
impose directly); the set of internal improvements dubbed ''the American system"
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(which were Henry Clay's aggressive legislative program to promote a stronger and
more integrated national economy); continued disputes over Congress's authority to
condition the entry of new states into the Union; and the war against Mexico. In a
wonderful new book on this period, David Currie suggests:
Look not to the judges, who, like blossoms at the whim of the capricious
butterfly, pollinate the constitutional fields now and then according to the
vagaries of litigation. [Instead, g]o to school ... with Presidents, with Cabinet
ministers, with members of Congress, who grapple with constitutional
conundrums every day, in every action they contemplate, in every exercise of
their official function.

Of course, constitutional decision making outside the Court hardly ended
there. We are probably all familiar with the constitutional challenges during the
Civil War period, including the President's inherent authority to take extreme
measures to counter a domestic emergency, such as unilaterally suspending habeas
corpus and deploying and managing Union forces in the absence of a formal
declaration of war. There was also of course Reconstruction, including hard
questions about whether (and how) the Southern states might have to be readmitted
into the Union and the conditions, if any, under which to recognize the legitimacy of
Southern governments; Congress's authority to pass progressive civil rights
legislation under the Thirteenth Amendment; the proper scope and substance of both
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; the impeachment and trial of a President
of the United States for not complying with a Jaw passed over his veto, one that he
considered to be unconstitutional; the legitimacy of using special prosecutors to
investigate and prosecute corrupt officials in the Grant Administration; the Electoral
Crisis of 1876; the assassinations oftwo presidents-Abraham Lincoln and James
Garfield; the necessity and legitimacy of Civil Service Reform; economic
depression; and national authority over territories owned by the United States.
Things hardly died down during the first three-quarters of the twentieth
century. The list is practically endless, but includes, among many other things, two
world wars, three presidential assassinations (as well as the premature death of
another president early in his term), another national depression, the fashioning of a
national economic recovery program, mass industrialization, several undeclared
wars, several controversial treaties negotiated by but rejected by the Senate, the
appointments of seven chiefjustices of the Supreme Court, the rise of the civil rights
movement, women's suffrage, the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment, the
addition of eleven new amendments to the Constitution, the rejection of three
nominees to the Supreme Court, the development of unilateral executive
agreements, and the forced resignations of one Supreme Court Justice and a
President of the United States. In these and many other matters, the Court played no
role; the critical constitutional judgments were made outside the Court. These are
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just the tip of the iceberg, for there have been other actions throughout this period,
as was the case throughout the nineteenth century, when presidents and members of
Congress have made constitutional judgments, including but not limited to
presidents' pardon decisions, presidents' proposing national legislation, presidents'
vetoing legislation, the deliberations of members of Congress over the standards for
impeachment and removal, representatives' and senators' votes for and against
legislation, presidents' negotiating treaties, senators' determining whether to ratify
treaties, presidents' standards for nominations, senators' determinations of the
standards for confirmation, presidents' standards for removing executive officials,
the Congress's standards for approving international agreements made by means
other than treaties, presidents' under-enforcement of federal laws and executive
orders, the Congress's decisions on how to discipline its own members for their
misconduct in office, and the uses of military force without declarations of war.
The third theme to consider in the aftermath of Meese's speech is the
significance of all this constitutional decision making outside the Court. A question,
long ignored by theorists, is how to evaluate the constitutional decision making of
the other branches. Here, I want to offer a few different frameworks within which to
evaluate such decision making. The first is to place such decision making within
one of three categories-the first is decision making that is subject to judicial
review, the second is decision making not subject to judicial review, and the third is
decision making to which the courts show great deference. In the first category,
members of Congress and the President recognize judicial precedents as persuasive
authority, but do not necessarily loosen their commitment to interpreting the
Constitution as each sees fit. In this category, it is important to recognize that the
choice about following judicial precedent is, in my judgment, a pragmatic one. The
question is not necessarily whether political authorities must proceed, but the
choices members of Congress make on how to expend their resources given the
likelihood of a conflict with the courts. Take, for instance, the congressional
response to the Court's decision in the late 1980s to strike down a Texas statute
prohibiting the burning of the American flag. The conventional wisdom is that
Congress passed a statute knowing that it would be struck down by the Court, and
thus only did so to pander to its constituents with the knowledge that there was no
real risk the statute would ever become law. I think the conventional wisdom gets it
wrong. It is equally, if not more plausible, that members of Congress asserted their
own views on the First Amendment. They had every right to disagree with the
Court's judgment on the extent to which the First Amendment protected flag
burning and acted accordingly. In so acting, the members of Congress demonstrated
an important dynamic in our constitutional system in which they are responding to
the Court and working towards change in constitutional law.
In each of these three categories, but especially the second one, we can see
presidents and members of Congress develop their own methods of interpreting the
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Constitution. These methods are not necessarily the same as courts use, but in my
view they are no less legitimate. For instance, the practice of each institution not
just to take Supreme Court precedent as persuasive authority, but .also to develop
their own precedents or traditions. In practice, one finds that presidents and
members of Congress have not restricted themselves strictly to a single source, such
as original understanding. Instead, presidents and members of Congress have
treated evolving practice and custom as a significant source of constitutional
meaning. For instance, James Madison as President justified supporting the
National Bank precisely on the ground that three decades of acceptance had
rendered the institution legitimate. The practice followed by Madison and several of
the other framers, such as Alexander Hamilton, was to make constitutional
judgments based on history, but not strictly the framers' and ratifiers' original
understanding. To the contrary, their approach was, as my friend Marty Flaherty
describes it, "experiential." He explains that, before Madison, Hamilton had
extolled this method, urging in The Federalist Papers, "Let experience, the least
fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these
[constitutional] questions." Hamilton illustrated what he meant by seeking to
distinguish relevant historical successes from failures in surveying how almost a
dozen different jurisdictions, foreign and domestic, modem and ancient, had dealt
with similar questions.
The third category is perhaps best exemplified by the current war on
terrorism. Just as courts played no significant role in resolving the political and
constitutional questions triggered by the Korean, Vietnam, and Persian GulfWars,
the odds are they will not play a decisive role in shaping the Administration's
antiterrorism initiatives and measures. While there have been some lower court
decisions challenging some of the policies of the Administration to maintain secrecy
in some areas (such as immigration hearings) for the sake of protecting national
security, none of them comes anywhere close to the heart of the Administration's
agenda. Instead, the antiterrorist measures enacted by Congress and implemented by
the President have each followed critical constitutional judgments by the leaders of
both branches on the scope of the authority ofboth Congress and the President to
thwart domestic terrorist activities. In reaching these judgments, our leaders again
have not looked to original understanding, but rather to our national experiences
with arguably similar threats in the past. They have searched for reliable evidence
of our traditions in the face of domestic threats to our national security, whether they
arise in declared wars such as World War II or undeclared wars such as the Civil
War.
Beyond these categories, we can measure the impact of constitutional decision
making outside the Court on the development of constitutional law. One, often
under appreciated fact is how much the Court depends on the support of the other
branches to solve crises in constitutional law. Indeed, the Court has never resolved a
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genuine crisis in constitutional law without the help or support of the other branches.
To appreciate the significance of the political branches to the implementation
of the Constitution, one should consider how different crises in constitutional law
are handled. The first to consider is a judicial crisis, which arises not when there is a
conflict between the Court and political authorities, but when political authorities
persistently refuse to follow and to retaliate against the Court's answer to a question
of constitutional meaning. Under this definition there have been remarkably few
genuine judicial crises. Many episodes commonly thought to constitute crises fall
short. For instance, the first time the Court exercised judicial review to strike down
a state law-Chisholm v. Georgia-was so unpopular that it took literally a matter
of days for the decision to be overturned by a constitutional amendment. While the
Chisholm decision provoked some controversy, the controversy subsided almost as
quickly as it arose.
A better candidate for a genuine judicial crisis is the resistance to, and
retaliation against, the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education I. The
Southern Manifesto, and other acts of defiance and protest, followed almost
immediately after the decision came down. The defiance persisted throughout most
of the 1960s, until the President and Congress decisively sided with the Court
through the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other progressive civil rights
measures.
Another popular candidate for a judicial crisis is the conflict generated by the
Supreme Court's propensity to protect economic liberties and property rights in the
first few decades of the twentieth century. This period covers both the Lochner era
and the New Deal era. In the Lochner era, or the period from 1893 to 1924,
Congress considered twenty proposals to curb the federal courts' jurisdiction in
retaliation against the Court's perceived activism. In the remarkably brief period
from 1935 to 1937, Congress considered thirty-seven bills proposing to curb the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. During his first term, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and other Democrats publicly criticized the Court's rulings striking down
several New Deal measures. By 1936, as Michael Klarman suggests, "both
Democrats and Republicans endorsed state minimum wage legislation, and thus [the
Court's decision in Morehead v. New York ex rei. Tipaldo] incited a firestorm of
criticism." That decision was the proximate cause of Roosevelt's infamous CourtPacking Plan, which was the most notorious of the many assaults undertaken at the
time against the Court. Though the proposal failed, constitutional scholars to this
day still debate the significance of this failure and its connection to the Court's
purported "switch in time."
Yet another possible judicial crisis has been engendered by Roe v. Wade. The
nation remains divided in its agreement with the fundamental rule announced in the
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case, and several presidents-Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W.
Bush-openly campaigned against the decision and purposely nominated as judges
people who were opposed to the decision. To this day, Republican and Democratic
presidents make choices of judicial nominees based to a significant degree on their
attitudes about the legitimacy of Roe. The persistence of the relevance of Roe to
judicial selection indicates the extent to which the political discord engendered by
the decision still rages.
A second kind of crisis is political. I submit a political crisis arises when
political authorities are fighting amongst themselves for supremacy over a particular
domain ofpolicymaking. Prime examples of political crises (of varying intensity)
are the set of presidential impeachments, beginning with Andrew Johnson and
including Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton. In the first of these instances, Congress
and the President were plainly in a contest for supremacy in dictating Reconstruction
policy. Interestingly, Johnson was not the first President to have been threatened
with impeachment because of his overzealous use of the veto (and efforts to assert
his will over domestic policymaking), but he was the first to be impeached, and thus
to face removal for his understanding and deployment of the prerogatives of his
office. As one can see, the magnitude of the crisis seems to have diminished with
each of the episodes, so the greatest controversy arises with Johnson because of the
great stakes involving the balance of power, followed by the serious conflict
between Nixon and Congress culminating in his resignation, and the more tepid
conflict-tepid, i.e., by relative comparison-of the Clinton impeachment ordeal.
The third kind of crisis is constitutional. I understand a constitutional crisis to
arise when conflicting authorities recognize the limits of the Constitution, i.e., when
contending authorities find or acknowledge that the Constitution provides no answer
to the controversy at hand. A constitutional crisis is not necessarily the result of the
joining of judicial and political crises. A constitutional crisis is not just a serious
conflict among the leaders of national political institutions, or between the courts
and the political branches, but rather a special circumstance in which political
leaders recognize that the Constitution provides no guidance and no adequate
process for resolving the political crisis at hand.
Where have we seen such crises? I suggest two examples here. The first is
that slavery precipitated a political crisis that ultimately transformed into a
constitutional crisis when the Southern states seceded from the Union. Secession
presented the President and the Congress with a problem for which the Constitution
had no answer. It came about in part because of the President's and Congress's
refusal to back down in trying to contain or get rid of slavery in spite of Dred Scott
v. Sandford. Hence, Dred Scott precipitated a judicial crisis that helped to transform
an ongoing political crisis over slavery into the constitutional crisis of secession. I
do not think Dred Scott, standing alone, constituted a constitutional crisis, because
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political authorities who disagreed with it were not unfamiliar with how to deal with
constitutional decisions with which they disagreed. Lincoln, for instance, simply
refused to acknowledge the decision as legitimate and thus to enforce it. In doing
so, he took a path previously trod by his predecessors in office who had fought to
protect a President's right to disagree with the Supreme Court and avoid compliance
with it, if at all possible. There were, however, no adequate constitutional
mechanisms available to solve secession.
Another example of a constitutional crisis occurred in 1800 when Thomas
Jefferson and Aaron Burr received the same number of votes in the Electoral
College. While they (and their supporters) knew which had run as President and
Vice President, and thus which should have been considered the victor in the
presidential election, Burr's refusal to acknowledge the obvious forced the House of
Representatives to resolve which of the two men was President. In making this
decision, the House received no guidance from the Constitution or historical
practices. While the House voted ultimately to designate Jefferson as President
(after several attempts), the confusion, discord, and uncertainty generated by the tie
vote in the Electoral College between the top two Republicans running in the
election precipitated a movement to amend the Constitution, culminating in the
Twelfth Amendment.
It is telling that the Court has not been able to resolve political crises on its
own. To begin with, judges lack the means to solve genuine political crises, and
national political leaders are instrumental in helping to resolve judicial crises. On
the few occasions when courts have triggered crises, judges have had to rely on the
political process ultimately to resolve them. I can think of no judicial crisis that
courts have settled on their own; For instance, it was not until all three institutions
of the national government fell into line behind the Court's decision mandating the
end of segregation in public schools, did the resistance break down. By then, Brown
had gone for more than a decade without full implementation in the deep South.
Even when courts have been called upon to resolve political crises, they have failed
to do so. Dred Scott is the most spectacular example of such a failure; it exacerbated
rather than helped to resolve the crisis over the future of slavery in the United States.
Again, Dred Scott helped to push the political crisis over slavery into a
constitutional crisis.
Nor can I think of a political crisis that courts have resolved. When political
crises have been resolved short of a constitutional crisis, it has not been by courts,
but by political leaders operating within the Constitution's intricate system of checks
and balances. Political crises are resolved through accommodations however
difficultly achieved through existing constitutional mechanisms. In other words,
political crises can be resolved by political leaders who struggle amongst themselves
until a political rather than a judicial solution is achieved. Andrew Johnson and Bill
Clinton did not challenge their impeachments in court, but rather they relied upon
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the constitutional process to absolve them. The political ill will generated by the
Alien and Sedition Acts ended not because of anything courts did, but rather
because of the actions of national political leaders. President Lincoln's unilateral
suspension of habeas corpus was undoubtedly a dubious act, which Chief Justice
Taney condemned as lawless; however, its ratification by Congress very shortly
thereafter clarified its legal basis even if the ratification did not fully resolve the
political fallout.
The fact that Congress ratified Lincoln's action was not of course the end of
the matter. The fact that Congress and the President ultimately joined together to
support suspension of habeas corpus illustrates another kind of political crisis that
has the distinct potential to transform into a constitutional crisis. This situation
arises when national authorities join together to retaliate against some relatively
defenseless segment of the population. This situation entails, in other words, a
conflict between national authorities on one side and a relatively powerless
constituency or group on the other. A prime example of such a conflict is the
internment of Japanese Americans in World War II. Federal military and political
leaders put together the internment plan with little or no evidence in support, but the
Supreme Court ratified it in a closely divided opinion. With political and judicial
authorities unified against them, the incarcerated Japanese Americans had no
recourse left-the Constitution was literally of no avail to them until well after the
war. A 1980 Act of Congress established a Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians to study the Japanese relocation during World War II. The
Commission concluded:
The promulgation of Executive Order 9066 [which the Court had upheld in
Korematsu] was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions which
followed from it [were] not driven by analysis of military conditions. The
broad historical causes which shaped [the exclusion decisions] were race
prejudice, war hysteria, and the failure of political leadership. [A] grave
injustice was done.
In 1984, a federal district court relied on the Commission's findings in granting a
writ of coram nobis and vacating the conviction of Fred Korematsu, the original
defendant in Korematsu. In 1988, President Reagan signed legislation formally
acknowledging injustices imposed by the internment and providing for the payment
of reparations. It is conceivable that in the framework I have suggested that the
exclusion and internment of Japanese Americans constitute a constitutional crisis
because clearly the Constitution provided no adequate mechanism to protect the
Japanese Americans on the West Coast from the "historical causes" cited by the
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. More precisely,
the lapses and failures that led to the exclusion and internment of Japanese
Americans during World War II could be understood as a crisis in which national

786

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 51

political, military, and judicial authorities joined together to deprive them a
constitutional remedy for the damage done to them.
Contrary to the protestations of many law professors, Bush v. Gore was not a
crisis in constitutional law. The case involved a conflict between federal and state
judicial authorities, but there was never a question of which of these authorities
reigned supreme. Once the Supreme Court decided Bush v. Gore, the debate was
not about whether the Supreme Court could overturn a state court judgment (settled
since Martin v. Hunter's Lessee), but rather whether the Court exercised its lawful
authority properly in the facts of this case. Even at the time the decision came
down, roughly half the country and almost all political authorities largely fell behind
it. Subsequent developments, particularly the war against terrorism, have increased
the odds against political retaliation against the Court for its decision.
While the Watergate tapes case clearly weakened the political opposition to
Nixon's impeachment, it would be wrong to think that it resolved the political
conflict between Nixon and Congress. As Gerald Gunther suggested, democratic
institutions were proceeding methodically to deal with Nixon's misconduct without
waiting for judicial support. Moreover, he suggested that this fact indicates there
was no genuine crisis provoked by the movement to impeach Nixon. Had Nixon not
resigned, there is every indication that he would not only have been impeached, but
there would also have been little doubt the Senate would have convicted and
removed him. The impeachment effort against Nixon had a momentum separate
from the judicial process.
The Jefferson Administration's attempted employment of the impeachment
power to create vacancies in the federal judiciary posed a different kind of political
crisis. It did not just begin, simply enough, from one judicial decision (or one
judge's actions), but rather the crass desire to use impeachment to get rid of"unfit"
judges apparently defined in such a manner as to apply only to Federalist judges.
This use of impeachment came to an end when the House impeached, but the Senate
acquitted, Associate Justice Samuel Chase for various acts, including assisting
prosecutions of Republicans for violating the Alien and Sedition Acts passed with
the backing of the Adams Administration. Chase's impeachment was a political
crisis because it threatened to transform impeachment power into a mechanism to
unseat a Justice for actions that could be remedied on appeal. It was a political
crises because judicial independence hung in the balance, but it was resolved by
political will.
It is tempting to perceive the New Deal as not fitting within the pattern of
political crises I have sketched. It is possible that, by taking a more deferential
stance toward progressive economic reform, the Court helped to defuse the brewing
controversy or crisis between it and national political authorities. There are,
however, two reasons this view is mistaken. First, there is every reason to think that
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the political institutions would have dealt with prolonged judicial resistance to the
New Deal. In time, President Roosevelt's appointees would surely have dominated
the Court, at which point the Court would have shifted its positions on economic due
process and the scope ofCongress's Commerce Clause Power. Second, there is still
reason to think that the Court backed down under enormous political pressure not
just from the Court-packing plan, but also Roosevelt's overwhelming reelection in
1936 and the mid-term elections of 1938. It is credible to think that one pivotal
Justice, Owen Roberts, was convinced to shift his position on economic due process
because of the signals sent by Roosevelt's landslide reelection based in part on his
campaign against the Court.
When the Court makes mistakes, we should keep in mind the Court's fate will
likely depend more on the Constitution outside the Court than on anything the Court
does. The structure of the Constitution provides the means by which the political
branches can correct (or at least try to correct what they regard as) judicial errors.
The Constitution provides a wide variety of mechanisms that they have used to
redress or retaliate against the Court's mistakes. We saw how quickly political
leaders reacted to correct what they perceived as the error of Chisholm v. Georgia.
In the aftermath of Roe we have seen presidents deride the decision, call for its
overruling, support legislation designed to weaken it, and seek to appoint justices
who would overturn (or at least severely limit) it; members of Congress, particularly
senators, question its legitimacy and propose both amendments and different kinds
of jurisdictional limits to overturn or limit the damage of the decision; and at least
four justices are prepared to overrule Roe. In other words, the critical response to
Roe has fastidiously tracked constitutional procedures.
The impact of the constitutional structure is evident from a survey of the
political crises generated by the electoral disputes of 1800, 1824, and 1876. In
1800, national leaders were vexed at the omissions of the original Constitution, and
their solution was to change the Constitution. In 1824, the failure of any of the
major presidential candidates to get a majority of electoral votes led to a proceeding
in the House in which Andrew Jackson claimed John Quincy Adams entered into a
"corrupt bargain" with Henry Clay to steal the election. Jackson took his case to the
American people, who heard his message and overwhelmingly elected him to the
presidency in 1828. In that circumstance, there was no need to change the
Constitution, because it provided the political means by which Jackson could seek
redress. In 1876, there were serious questions about the outcomes of close votes in
some states (including Florida), forcing the House back into the position to resolve
the disputes. Relying on the constitutional language empowering each chamber of
Congress to adopt appropriate procedures to implement their respective authorities,
the House appointed a special commission, which rendered a rather dubious opinion
about how disputed electoral votes should be counted. Samuel Tilden graciously
accepted the commission's vote, while Rutherford B. Hayes agreed to serve only
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one term as a means to quiet discontent over the decision. Hayes agreed further to
cut a deal with Southern Democrats to end Reconstruction in exchange for their not
challenging further the commission decision. There was nothing extra-constitutional
about these measures.
To the contrary, these informal agreements were arranged within the checks
and balances set forth in the Constitution. A genuine constitutional crisis was
ultimately averted because the checks and balances of the Constitution proved
adequate to force the disputants in a political crisis into a peaceful resolution of their
conflict. Political crises present prime opportunities to measure the extent to which
the Constitution's checks and balances can force parties into accommodations.
When the parties to a dispute make recourse to existing constitutional mechanisms
to resolve their differences, there is plainly no constitutional crisis. When the parties
are unable to work out their differences through existing checks and balances, a
constitutional crisis is likely to ensue.
The dynamic in a genuine constitutional crisis is, however, radically different
from those of judicial and political crises. It is here that the limits of written
constitutionalism have been not only reached but also exceeded. This is the rare
circumstance in which the contending parties recognize that the Constitution
provides no answer to their dispute or even the means, as it exists at the time of their
dispute, by which to resolve it.
Consider, again, the example of secession. The contending sides clearly had
their respective arguments, many of which were claimed to have been grounded in
the Constitution or some authoritative source of constitutional meaning. The
difficulty was that the sides could not agree on how, or even whether, the
Constitution provided the means by which to resolve their different views on the
constitutionality or legitimacy of secession. Secession was the culmination of the
failure of either political or judicial authorities to settle the legitimacy and future of
slavery on then existing constitutional terms. There simply was no common or
middle ground left for the major disputants to settle their fundamentally different
visions of the Constitution, including the nation's and states' respective authorities
under it. The middle ground of course would have to have been something
grounded in or consistent with the Constitution, but none was ever found. Hence, it
is only in the rare circumstance of a constitutional crisis, as I have defined it, that the
Constitution is of no avail. And that is precisely the point, for the crisis is the
anxiety and conflict generated by the recognition that the Constitution cannot, and
does not, solve the crisis facing the country.
The fourth and final set of developments after Meese's speech that I wish to
consider has to do with another forum, outside the Court, in which the Constitution
figures prominently. Here, I refer to the significance and quality of public discourse
about the Constitution. My concern here is with citizens' talk about the
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Constitution. People discuss the Constitution at home, in school, and at work. The
Constitution is also discussed in newspapers and on television, radio, and the
Internet. No one has measured the quality or extent of this discussion, but surely it
helps to give substance and shape to public attitudes reflected in polling and in
social norms that guide public policy.
My own profession contributes significantly to this discourse, though its
contributions are not without problems. The problems are evident in two
developments in how constitutional theorists treat the Constitution. I consider these
important because nowhere outside the Court is the Constitution more frequently
debated, analyzed, and probed than the halls of legal academia.
The first development of note is the growing skepticism of constitutional
theorists that the federal judiciary serves a meaningful counter-majoritarian function.
For example, one problem with the structure of our federal courts, particularly the
Supreme Court, is that as an institution it is not sufficiently insulated from the
problem of partisan entrenchment. By the problem of partisan entrenchment, I mean
the risk that a President can appoint a number ofjustices who will serve on the Court
long after the President that appointed them has left office, the political party whose
views they reflect might have lost political favor, and the people of the United States
perhaps have concluded that they would prefer for justices to reflect different views
on the Constitution. Recall that John Marshall was the last Federalist appointed to
the Supreme Court. He served on the Court long after his Federalist Party expired,
and to his critics, sought to advance, through his rulings, the long discredited views
ofhis long dead party. Recall further after Roosevelt and Truman appointed eleven
justices between them, the New Deal outlook they each reflect had perhaps become
antiquated. We are, however, stuck with the justices in spite of these changes.
The attack on the Court as a genuinely counter-majoritarian difficulty also
takes another tack. Several scholars have suggested that the Supreme Court is not
necessarily a counter-majoritarian institution, in that its decisions largely, if not
almost entirely, track majoritarian sentiments and preferences. The presumption of
these scholars is that constitutional decision making outside the courts exercises a
significant degree of influence over the functioning of the Supreme Court. It might
be instructive to examine in greater detail the form and content of such
constitutional discourse.
The second noteworthy development relates to the objective of constitutional
scholarship. Just what is its purpose? This is not merely an academic question. For
it comes up not just here but in confirmation hearings, like those held last week for
one of your next distinguished visitors Michael McConnell, whom President Bush
nominated to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Throughout
his hearings, McConnell was pressed to explain how his strong criticism of some
prominent Supreme Court precedents, particularly Roe v. Wade, could be reconciled
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with his obligation as a federal judge not to have prejudged the questions likely to
come before him. He was pressed hard to reconcile with his duties as a judge his
praise for a lower court judge's refusal to abide by the Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade. He suggested in response that his praise had been given with tongue in
cheek, and that in fact it was intended as a mild rebuke. More generally, he
acknowledged that on some issues his thinking had evolved while on many others he
had taken provocative positions because that is how the academic game is played, it
is how to make a name for oneself and provoke further discussion.
Without disagreeing with soon-to-be Judge McConnell, I suggest that his
provocative scholarship is also a major, even perhaps the major, reason for his
nomination to a federal court of appeals. When another federal appellate court
nominee suggested his provocative comments before the Federalist Society were not
necessarily reflective of his genuine views on the subject on which he was
commenting-the Commerce Clause-his answer seemed rather disingenuous. For
there can be no doubt that the comments themselves got the attention of the people
in the White House, which nominated him to his current position.
The distancing of nominees from their writings raises some serious questions.
I hasten to add that it is natural and laudatory for a person's views and thinking to
evolve over time, not unlike James Madison who moved from opposing the National
Bank early in his career to accepting it as President of the United States. That is not
bad company to keep. It is especially important that a judge be capable not just of
self-criticism but open to differing views and to having those views shape his own
thinking on the issues that come before him. But the distancing nevertheless raises
questions about what the purpose of constitutional theorizing is and particularly how
other people are to rely on it.
The conventional view is that theorists had at least two missions. The first
was to speak the truth, i.e., simply to probe and analyze the issues as thoroughly as
they could and call them as they saw them. The second was to speak truth to power,
i.e., to give to governing authorities the theorists' best thinking on the subject in
question. Yet another mission that has been undertaken with increasing zeal over the
years has been advocacy, i.e., writing an article or book that effectively serves as a
brief for one side or another on an important question of constitutional law. Yet,
Professor McConnell's comments suggest still other missions. One seems to be
either to entertain or amuse, perhaps with some instructive objective in mind. One
objective seems to be provocative, not for the sake of clarifying the truth or speaking
truth to power, but merely to get ahead, merely for self-aggrandizement. When one
reads an article, say, by Professor McConnell or anyone else for that matter, it is
hard now to know how seriously to take them. Should judges be prepared to rely on
seemingly meticulous research in an article or should they or their clerks check the
research on their own now, because they can no longer be sure whether the person
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writing the article had some undisclosed objective, no longer believes what he or she
wrote, or merely was trying to dazzle others with his or her intelligence.
My objective, I hasten to add, is not to quarrel with Professor McConnell. I
not only have supported his nomination to the federal court of appeals, but also
genuinely feel he is one of the most thoughtful, honest, diligent, and respectable
scholars of his generation. I have no doubts whatsoever that he will prove to be a
credit to the federal bench. I also feel that his path to the federal court of appeals
requires us to reconsider how we talk about the Constitution outside the Court. In
particular, it requires, I think, that we need to clarify the objective of our
commentary. So, in closing, I want to remind you that my comments tonight have
been intended solely for the purpose of provoking further thought about one of the
most under appreciated dimensions of constitutional law, constitutional discourse
undertaken outside the Supreme Court. Tonight is a wonderful example of how
such discourse may be undertaken with great civility, tolerance, perhaps a little
humor, and a lot of attention. Thank you.

